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Abstract: 
We develop a model to investigate the manner in which the pricing, profitability, and protection strategies of a seller of 
a proprietary digital good respond to changing market conditions. Specifically, we investigate how product piracy and 
the presence of open source software alternatives (such as Open Office) impact the optimal strategy of a seller of 
proprietary software (such as Microsoft Office). In contrast to previous literature, we show that firms may make more 
(rather than less) effort to control piracy when network externalities are strong. In addition, we show that the level of 
network externalities amplifies losses incurred by an incumbent due to high-quality pirated goods. Therefore, for 
products characterized by high network externalities (such as software), sellers need to try to maintain a large 
perceived quality gap between their product and illegal copies. Further, we demonstrate that the appearance of an 
OSS alternative leads the incumbent to reduce both price and the level of piracy control. Although high-quality pirated 
goods are detrimental to profits in the absence of OSS, they may actually limit the incumbent’s losses and the need to 
adjust price and protection strategies due to the introduction of an OSS alternative. Thus, an incumbent may find it 
easier to compete with OSS in the presence of product piracy. Finally, highly correlated intrinsic valuation between an 
incumbent and OSS products require smaller adjustments to price and piracy controls and leads to muted impact on 
incumbent profit. 
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1 Introduction 
Researchers have often depicted the pervasiveness of product piracy as one of the most serious threats 
to firms that produce digital goods such as software, movies, and music (Chellappa & Shivendu, 2005; 
Jain, 2008; Prasad & Mahajan, 2003; Waters, 2015). The digital goods industry has tried to fight piracy in 
various ways, including publicizing its damages, educating the public on copyright law, engaging in legal 
actions against copyright offenders, and using protective technological systems such as digital rights 
management (DRM) (Raghu, Sinha, Vinze, & Burton, 2009). Consistent with this view, the academic 
literature that has incorporated technology-based piracy protection as a firm decision variable has found 
that profits can increase with higher level of protection (Conner & Rumelt, 1991; Sundararajan, 2004).  
However, despite its potentially harmful effects, some producers can also benefit from consumer piracy. 
For example, Conner and Rumelt (1991) and Jain (2008) demonstrate (in monopoly and duopoly settings, 
respectively) that producers may benefit from tolerating piracy in the presence of network externalities 
because piracy increases the externality benefits that accrue to legal buyers and also removes those who 
have a low willingness to pay from the market, which reduces price competition. Piracy may also help 
incumbents accelerate product diffusion in markets, especially during early stages of the product lifecycle 
(Givon, Mahajan, & Muller 1995). Gayer and Shy (2003) analyzed the markets for digital products and 
concluded that, if network externalities are strong enough, a publisher may gain from distributing a lower-
quality version of its product. Accordingly, investing in piracy-control measures may not necessarily be an 
optimal strategy for digital products.  
Another variable that impacts the way in which piracy affects the industry is the quality differential between 
the original and illegal copies (Geng & Lee, 2013). In some contexts, such as digital music, this differential 
may be very small, while, in others, such as software, it tends to be significant. Although most of the 
theoretical models of piracy assume perfect substitutability between copies and the original product, it is 
clear that the existence of a quality differential impacts sellers’ optimal strategies and profit levels. In 
particular, Sundararajan (2004) has shown that increases in the quality of the pirated good cause the 
producer to optimally reduce prices. 
Moreover, the emergence of open source software (OSS) alternatives creates significant new 
complications for software producers. Currently, OSS is available in virtually all software categories. 
Examples include Linux (operating system), Apache (Web server), Mozilla Firefox (Web browser), Mozilla 
Thunderbird (email), RapidMiner (data mining), Open Office (office package) and ADempiere (ERP 
Applications). The literature on the topic (see von Krogh & von Hippel, 2006, for a comprehensive review) 
has analyzed individuals’ motivation for producing OSS software, for participating in OSS communities, 
and the competition between OSS and proprietary software (Lakhani & von Hippel, 2003; Bagozzi & 
Dholakia, 2006; Lerner & Tirole, 2005; Casadesus-Masanell & Ghemawat, 2006). In particular, 
Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat (2006) considered a dynamic mixed-duopoly model to study the 
impact of Linux on Microsoft’s strategies for Windows and on the market equilibrium. Among other results, 
they found that the appearance of Linux lowered Microsoft’s profits but that Microsoft would likely sustain 
its leadership position by dropping its prices relative to monopoly levels. Although the authors briefly 
discuss the introduction of piracy in their model, they assumed the piracy rate to be small and exogenous 
rather than being endogenously determined by market conditions and/or by Microsoft’s piracy control 
strategy. Powerful incumbents such as Microsoft find themselves caught between zero (or very low) price 
OSS competitors and digital pirates, which forces them to reconsider the trade-offs between their price 
setting and copyright protection strategies. Products such as Linux and Open Office have continued to 
become strong competitors in their markets (Baker, 2009). For example, LibreOffice (a derivative of Open 
Office) has millions of users (Rubens, 2015). Therefore, the extent to which OSS impacts the strategies of 
the sellers of proprietary software and market equilibrium in the presence of product piracy remains an 
open and important question.  
Because OSS is either free or available at a cost substantially lower than comparable proprietary software 
applications, consumers’ could have a lower propensity to pirate in an OSS environment. Intuitively, 
although the availability of OSS may threaten the market share of incumbent software, its presence also 
allows potential and existing pirates to consider free and legal alternatives to proprietary software. The 
availability of such free OSS alternatives may, therefore, limit the potential of piracy controls to convert 
pirates into buyers and, ultimately, reduce the firms’ incentives to protect its products.  
To address these issues, we develop an analytical model to study how the pricing, profitability, and 
protection strategies of the seller of a proprietary good respond to changing market conditions. To the best 
Journal of the Association for Information Systems 3  
 
Volume 18   Issue 1  
 
of our knowledge, no theoretical work has thus far investigated how the varying quality of pirate goods 
affect the optimal strategy of such a seller (in particular, its piracy control strategy) and the market 
equilibrium in the presence of an OSS alternative. 
Table 1 summarizes the main assumptions regarding key variables in the five theoretical papers that 
relate most closely to our work. By focusing on the assumptions that these papers have in common with 
our model, we highlight our paper’s specific contributions in assessing the impact of piracy on incumbent 
demand. 
Table 1. Assumptions Regarding Key Variables in Relevant Theoretical Work 
 
Conner &  
Rumelt (1991) 
Jain (2008) 
Sundararajan 
(2004) 
Shy & Thisse 
(1999) 
Casadesus-
Masanell & 
Ghemawat 
(2006) 
This Paper 
Piracy 
protection 
Exogenous Endogenous Endogenous Exogenous Not Considered Endogenous 
Quality of 
pirated good 
Fixed: Perfect 
Substitute 
Varying: 
imperfect 
substitute 
Varying: 
imperfect 
substitute 
Not considered Not Considered 
Varying: 
imperfect 
substitute 
Consumers’ 
pirating costs 
Fixed Fixed Fixed (free) Fixed Not Considered Varying 
Network 
externalities 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Demand 
estimation 
Exogenous Exogenous Endogenous Endogenous Endogenous Endogenous 
Open source 
alternatives 
No No No No Yes Yes 
Market 
structure 
Monopoly Duopoly Monopoly Duopoly 
Mixed 
oligopoly 
Mixed 
oligopoly 
Model 
dynamics 
Static Static Static Static Dynamic Static 
Note: bold items reflect issues that we incorporate in this paper. The table points out that other papers have address some but not 
all of these factors. 
Specifically, our contributions stem from examining the strategy of a digital good producer when 1) one 
treats piracy protection, prices, and the demand for incumbent and pirated goods as endogenous, 2) the 
quality of the pirated good is not fixed, 3) product demand depends on network externalities, 4) the cost of 
pirating varies across consumers, and, finally, 5) a viable OSS alternative exists for consumers. In 
addition, we note that our work represents the first attempt to model the impact of OSS on the demand for 
both incumbent and pirated goods—an important contribution given the increasing importance, availability, 
and usage of OSS. 
Our main results are as follows. First, in sharp contrast to most of the existing work on piracy and network 
externalities, we show that there are realistic conditions under which a firm may want to increase piracy 
controls in response to increasing network externalities. Second, our results indicate that the losses 
incurred to an incumbent due to high-quality pirated goods are amplified by the level of network 
externalities. Therefore, the need to maintain a large perceived quality gap between the incumbent product 
and illegal copies becomes even more pressing for product categories that are characterized by high 
network externalities (such as software). Third, we find that the appearance of an OSS alternative leads the 
incumbent to reduce both the price and its level of piracy control. However, the impact of OSS alternative is 
fully moderated by its quality level and the correlation of its intrinsic valuation with that of the incumbent 
product. Further, although high-quality pirated goods harm an incumbent’s profits, high-quality piracy may 
actually limit the incumbent’s losses that result from the appearance of an OSS alternative in the market and 
the incumbent’s need to respond to the alternative through adjustments to price and piracy control.  
This paper proceeds as follows. In Sections 2 to 4, we present the theoretical models for software piracy 
in the absence and presence of OSS and our main findings based on solving the model analytically and 
through simulations. In Section 5, we conclude the paper and discuss the implications and directions for 
future research. 
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2 Software Piracy Model with Endogenous Demand 
We begin our analysis by describing the model in the absence of an OSS alternative (Section 2.1) and 
investigate how a firm’s optimal strategies, demand level, and profits vary with the levels of network 
externalities and quality of the pirated good (Sections 2.2 and 2.3). In Section 3, we analyze the impact of 
the appearance of an OSS alternative on the optimal strategy of an incumbent, who now has to deal with 
both a pirated product and a free (or nearly free) but legal alternative. The complexity of this model 
necessitated a simulation analysis since we could not obtain closed-form solutions for the optimization 
problem. We present this analysis in Section 4. 
2.1 The Model 
Consider a market for an information good where consumers’ “intrinsic” valuations for the good (i.e., 
abstracting from benefits that one may draw from the fact that other consumers also use the same 
product) is distributed uniformly over 𝑋 ∈ [0, θX]. One determines the utility from using the information 
good by the intrinsic value of the product to the consumer (𝑋), the size of the externality benefit from using 
the product (𝛼 ∈ [0,1]), and its price. A consumer who buys an incumbent’s software copy or acquiring a 
pirated copy of it extracts value that depends on the network externality factor, 𝛼, and the demands for the 
information good (𝜓𝑙𝑒𝑔, 𝜓𝑝𝑖𝑟 ). 
Consumers can choose to purchase a legal copy of the good at a price (𝑝) or to acquire a pirated copy, in 
which case the effects of pirating depends on the piracy controls that the producer has imposed (𝐿) and 
the exogenous quality of the pirated good (𝑞). We consider that piracy control affects users in proportion 
to their individual cost of pirating (𝑐). That is, the higher the firm sets the piracy control level at, the higher 
the costs the pirates incur to use the pirated product. Piracy controls imposed by the producer may result 
in reduced functionalities (such as disabled features, watermark on printouts that signal pirated version, 
and persistent warning messages), extra effort to acquire or overcome registration requirements, lack of 
product updates, and the inability to exchange documents with other users. The more severe the piracy 
controls, more effort and costs the user incurs in ensuring that the pirated software works. The initial 
model assumes that the cost incurred ( 𝑐 𝜖 [0,1]) is constant across all consumers; we relax this 
assumption in subsequent models. On the other hand, we assume the exogenous quality factor (𝑞 𝜖 [0,1]) 
to affect the intrinsic value and the externality value. The exogenous quality factor models the ability of 
pirates to support the individual consumer. For instance, pirated goods’ quality may improve if alternate 
websites post product updates on an ongoing basis, post replacement registration codes frequently, and 
maintain an extensive knowledge base for tricks and tips to overcome piracy controls. 
Whereas an increase in the quality of a pirated good can benefit the pirate directly, incumbent users 
benefit indirectly due to the network externality generated by the pirates’ demand. 
Model 1 describes the utility for a random consumer in this setting: 
 
Buy a legitimate copy from incumbent 
Acquire a pirated copy 
Do nothing 
(1) 
Consumers choose to buy, pirate, or do without depending on how they value the good (𝑋) relative to two 
thresholds (𝑋1 and 𝑋2). Equation 2 describes the marginal consumer who is indifferent between buying 
and pirating as:  
𝑋1 =
𝑝 − 𝑐𝐿
1 − 𝑞
 (2) 
 
Equation 3 describes the marginal consumer who is indifferent between pirating and doing nothing (i.e., 
neither purchase nor pirate) as: 
𝑋2 =
𝑐𝐿 − 𝛼(𝜓𝑙𝑒𝑔 + 𝑞𝜓𝑝𝑖𝑟)
𝑞
 (3) 
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Thus, the demand functions for the three segments (where 𝜓𝑑𝑜𝑁 represents consumers who do not pirate 
or buy the incumbent product; i.e., the “do-nothing” segment) are: 
𝜓𝑙𝑒𝑔 = 1 −
𝑝 − 𝑐𝐿
1 − 𝑞
, 𝜓𝑝𝑖𝑟 =
𝑝𝑞 − 𝑐𝐿(1 − 𝛼) + 𝛼 − (𝑝 + 𝑞)𝛼
𝑞(1 − 𝑞)(1 − 𝛼)
,  𝜓𝑑𝑜𝑁 =
𝑐𝐿(1 − 𝛼) − 𝛼 + 𝑝𝛼
1 − 𝑞
 (4) 
The profit function for the incumbent firm is the revenue generated from the demand for the incumbent’s 
product and the costs incurred in producing the information good. We describe the incumbent’s profit with 
the following equation: 𝜋𝑙𝑒𝑔 = 𝑝𝜓𝑙𝑒𝑔 − (𝐿𝑞)
2. 
The costs associated with piracy control are a function of the level of piracy control and the exogenous 
quality of the pirated good. We expect higher-quality pirated goods to impact an incumbent’s costs in 
implementing piracy control. For instance, higher-quality pirated goods will require one to expend more 
development effort to implement more piracy controls. An incumbent producer may have to incur 
additional costs in bringing down alternate websites that are selling/sharing the pirated good. Piracy 
controls (such as complex encryption codes, registration requirements, and installation limitations) can 
cause buyers to more frequently call the organization’s support lines. Thus, highe- quality pirated goods 
can increase costs to support customers due to more stringent piracy controls.  
Using the producer’s profit equation (𝜋𝑙𝑒𝑔 = 𝑝𝜓𝑙𝑒𝑔 − (𝐿𝑞)
2), we can derive the optimal price, 𝑝∗  and 
optimal piracy control level, 𝐿∗. Apart from the non-negativity constraints on 𝑝∗ and 𝐿∗, from Equation 4, we 
see that the constraints to ensure that the “do-nothing” and piracy segments are non-negative are 𝐿 ≥
𝑝𝑞+𝛼−𝛼(𝑝+𝑞)
𝑐(1−𝛼)
 and 𝐿 ≤
𝛼(1−𝑝)
𝑐(1−𝛼)
, respectively. 
Taken together, these constraints lead to four distinct solutions. We discuss each of these cases, which 
we derived from optimizing four cases (binding or non-binding) associated with the two constraints on L 
above, below. 
Case A (incumbent buyers only): when both constraints are binding, both the pirate and do-nothing 
segments are eliminated (substituting 𝐿 =
𝑝𝑞+𝛼−𝛼(𝑝+𝑞)
𝑐(1−𝛼)
 and 𝐿 =
𝛼−𝑝𝛼
𝑐(1−𝛼)
 in Function 4 above). In this 
case, 𝑝∗ = 𝛼; 𝐿∗ =
𝛼
𝑐
. Intuitively, the price increases with externality benefits and piracy controls are set 
such that they nullify all the externality benefits to the pirates. The optimal profit level is given by 𝜋𝐴
∗ = 𝛼 −
𝑞2𝛼2
𝑐2
, which decreases in the quality of the pirated good (𝑞) and increasing in consumer’s piracy cost (𝑐).  
Case B (incumbent buyers and pirates only): when the first constraint is binding (i.e., 𝐿∗ =
𝑝𝑞+𝛼−𝛼(𝑝+𝑞)
𝑐(1−𝛼)
), 
only the do-nothing segment is eliminated. In this case, the equation 𝑝∗ =
𝑐2(1−𝑞(1−𝛼))(1−𝛼)+2(1−𝑞)𝑞2𝛼2
2𝑐2(1−𝛼)+2(1−𝑞)𝑞2𝛼2
 describes the optimal value; substituting this optimal value of p in Equation 1 
provides optimal profits of 𝜋𝐵
∗ =  
𝑐2(1+𝑞(1−𝛼))2−4(1−𝑞)𝑞3𝛼2
4(1−𝑞)(𝑐2(1−𝛼)+(1−𝑞)𝑞2𝛼2)
.  
Profit under case B is strictly higher than that of the case when only legal buyer segment exists (case A). 
Therefore, case B dominates case A whenever it is a feasible solution (i.e.,  𝜋𝐵
∗ − 𝜋𝐴
∗ =
(𝑐2(1−𝑞(1−𝛼)−2𝛼)+2(1−𝑞)𝑞2𝛼2)
2
4𝑐2(1−𝑞)(𝑐2(1−𝛼)+(1−𝑞)𝑞2𝛼2)
≥ 0), which suggests that the combination of q, c ,and α values determines 
firms’ incentive to tolerate piracy; as externality benefits ( 𝛼 ) increase and the cost of pirating (c) 
decreases, the threshold for pirated good quality (q) at which the firm will move to eliminate piracy 
decreases progressively.  
Case C (incumbent buyers and do-nothing segment only): when the second constraint is binding (i.e., 𝐿 =
𝛼(1−𝑝)
𝑐(1−𝛼)
), piracy demand is eliminated. In this case, optimal price and piracy controls are:  
𝑝∗ =
𝑐2(1−𝛼)−2(1−𝑞)𝑞2(𝑞−𝛼)𝛼
2𝑞2(𝑞−𝛼)2+2𝑐2(1−𝛼)
, 𝐿∗ =
𝑐(𝛼+𝑞(1−2𝛼))
2𝑞2(𝑞−𝛼)2+2𝑐2(1−𝛼)
 (5) 
Case D (all three segments exist): when both constraints are non-binding, optimal price and piracy control 
are as follows: 
𝑝∗ =
2(1−𝑞)2𝑞2
4(1−𝑞)𝑞2−𝑐2
, 𝐿∗ =
𝑐(1−𝑞)
4(1−𝑞)𝑞2−𝑐2
 (6) 
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Note that optimal price and piracy controls are a function of the network effects, 𝛼, only in cases A, B, and 
C (i.e., when the incumbent segment exists with either the do-nothing or the pirate segments—not both). 
In case D, price and piracy control levels are independent of network externalities, which implies that, 
when the market is fully covered at equilibrium (i.e., all three segments have non-zero demand), 
producers are not constrained by effects of network externalities when implementing piracy controls. 
2.2 Dominance Regions 
 
Figure 1. Demand regions Under Different Values of c1 
In Figure 1, we systematically examine the emergence of the four cases for various values of c 
(customer’s cost of pirating). Each graph is a contour plot that involves pirated good quality (q) on the x-
axis and network externality (𝛼) on the y-axis. First, note that case D (all three segments exist) seldom 
                                                     
1 Note: the graphs have A, B, C, and D regions (where applicable), which correspond to the four cases of model 1. The four graphs 
correspond to an increasing value of c in each column. We tested for a range of c between 0.1 to 0.9. 
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emerges as a dominant solution even over a very large range of parameter values. Specifically, as the 
consumer’s cost of pirating increases, consumers do not engage in pirating and the region pertaining to 
case D approaches zero. This result arises from the fact that producers have strong incentives to 
eliminate the pirate segments through price and piracy control manipulations. When the pirated good is 
high quality, demand for the pirated good is high (case B exists); however, with an increase in network 
externality, the value for the incumbent good increases and case A prevails. In addition, case C (piracy 
eliminated) tends to dominate with low network externality () and high cost of pirating (c). Finally, when q 
and  are high enough, case A tends to dominate unless the model has no feasible solution, which the 
blank regions in the graphs indicate. 
Table 2 provides the comparative statics for the four cases (cases A-D). The comparative statics results 
provide the rationale for the observed dominance regions. If the pirated good is very low quality, it will not 
pose a significant threat to the firm, and, thus, the firm will tolerate piracy through a low level of protection. 
If, furthermore, externalities are high enough, then it will be very important for the incumbent to eliminate 
the do-nothing segment, which one can do via combining a high price and a low to moderate level of 
protection. When the pirated good (q) is high quality, piracy is a serious threat to the firm, and, therefore, 
the level of protection will have to be high. However, under a high level of externalities, discouraging 
piracy will potentially have the very negative effect of driving some pirates out of the market and that, in 
turn, reduces product value for legal consumers. A firm can avoid this through combining high protection 
and low to moderate prices, which will be successful in eliminating both the piracy and do-nothing 
segments unless the model has no feasible solution. Such infeasible cases, which correspond to the blank 
regions in the graphs, arise mainly when the consumer cost of pirating (c) is low. For example, Figures 1a 
and 1b (c = 0.1 and c = 0.5, respectively) show that, for products characterized by low network 
externalities, the producer can participate in the market (i.e., generate positive profits) even in the 
presence of high-quality pirated good (i.e., high q). However, as network externalities increase, the 
producer’s market participation is eliminated for progressively higher values of q (i.e., the infeasibility 
region becomes larger). Basically, this result means that, for high levels of q and , the firm cannot charge 
a positive price or protect its good, which eliminates it from the market. 
Table 2. Comparative Statics for Model 1 
Case Effect of network externality (α) Effect of quality of pirated good (q) 
Case A (incumbent 
buyers only) 
P: (+)  
L: (+) 
Profit: (+) if c2 > 2q2α 
P: 0 
L: 0 
Profit: (-) 
Case B (incumbent 
buyers and pirates only) 
P: (+) 
L: (+) if c2 > q2α2(1- q2)/1+q(1-α)2 
Profit: (+) if c2 > 2q2α (1- q2)/1-q(1-α) 
Incumbent demand: (+) if c2 > q2α(1- q)(2+qα 
(2-α)) 
Pirate demand: (-) 
P: (+) if α< 2(1-q2(1- α)-q) 
L: (-) 
Profit: (±) 
Incumbent demand: (+)  
Pirate demand: (-)  
Case C (incumbent 
buyers and do-nothing 
segment only) 
P: (+) if c2 > 2q3(1- q)( q-α)2/ q2+ 
(2-α)(α-2q α) 
L: (+) if c2 > q2(α-q)(α-q(-3+2q+2 α))/1-q 
Profit: (+) if c2 > 2q2(1-q)(q+α)  
Incumbent demand: (+) if q2>α 
P: (-) if c2 < q3 (q-α)2/ (3q α2+ 
2 q2 (1-2α)-α2) 
L: (-)  
Profit: (-) if α<1/2 and c2 > 2q3 α (q-
α)/(α+q(2-4α))  
Incumbent demand: (+) 
Case D (All three 
segments exist) 
P: 0  
L: 0 
Profit: 0 
Incumbent demand: 0 
Pirate demand: (+) if c2 > 4q2(1- q) 
P: (-) 
L: (-) if c2 <8q(1-q)2 
Profit: (-) 
Incumbent demand: (+) if q>2/3 
Pirate demand: (+) if α<c2(2q2(6+q(3q-10))- 
c2)/ 2q2(c2(1-2q)+ 4q2(1-q)2) 
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2.3 Model Results 
Table 2 shows that the sign and magnitude of the effects of q and α on the endogenous variables vary 
with the region of dominance, which, in turn, depends on combination of parameter values (α, q, and c). 
Interestingly, as we note in Section 2.2, our analysis of the dominance regions indicates that case D 
(where all three segments exist) is almost never dominant. Therefore, we concentrate our discussion on 
cases A to C. Figure 2 illustrates the joint impact of exogenous parameters on optimal price, piracy 
control, and profits (lighter shades indicate higher value; all graphs drawn with c = 0.85).  
 
Figure 2. Optimal Price and Piracy Controls 
We describe the main implications of our model (as Table 2 and Figure 2 evidence) below. 
Implication 1: In response to an increase in the level of externalities, incumbent firms tend to 
increase both price and piracy control. 
Higher network externalities bring added value to legal consumers and pirates. Consequently, the firm 
captures that value by raising prices. Interestingly, Figure 2 shows that firms find it optimal to do so even 
when the quality of the pirated good is low. However, such a price rise could have the negative effect of 
driving some legal buyers out of the market or of transforming them into pirates. One can avoid the former 
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danger by limiting the price increase to the point where the marginal buyer becomes indifferent between 
buying and doing without it. One can avoid the drawback of a potential increase in piracy, on the other 
hand, by increasing piracy controls. As a result of such an optimal adjustment, legal demand for a firm’s 
products will tend to increase (or remain constant in case A). As for profits, network externality has an 
overall positive effect on them because the added revenue fully compensates the increased cost of 
protection. 
Note that our results contrast sharply with those of Conner and Rumelt (1991), who show that a threshold 
level of network externalities above which profits decrease monotonically with protection exists (implying 
zero protection with high externalities). They rationalize their model by noting that protection moves some 
pirates into the buying camp but it also pushes some pirates out of the user base. If externalities are high, 
the latter effect (i.e., pushing some pirates out of the user base) is very detrimental, and, therefore, the 
firm chooses not to protect. However, this reasoning requires two very specific conditions: 1) both demand 
and price are exogenous and 2) all three demand segments exist. In contrast, by treating both price and 
piracy control as endogenous, our model implies that, at high levels of externalities, firms will choose that 
combination of these instruments that allows them to eliminate the do-nothing segment and possibly also 
the pirate segment. In other words, by not assuming the existence of all segments, our results could fall 
into cases A, B or C, for which the optimal level of piracy control increases with network externalities.  
Implication 2:  In response to an increase in the quality of pirated goods, incumbent firms tend to 
decrease both piracy control and price. 
An increase in q increases the attractiveness of piracy and, therefore, poses a threat to firms. The 
comparative statics results of Table 2 show that firms will respond to such a threat by decreasing piracy 
controls and dropping prices in all cases except Case B where the incumbent product and the pirated 
good directly compete with each other.  
To understand why an incumbent firm lowers piracy controls due to high-quality pirated goods, note that 
high-quality piracy generates higher externality benefits for legitimate users of the incumbent’s product, 
which causes an incentive to tolerate pirates. In addition, the cost of implementing piracy controls increase 
with increasing pirate quality2. Therefore, increasing piracy controls becomes more costly as pirated 
goods’ quality increases. If incumbent firm attempts to increase piracy-control level, it will have the 
potentially negative effect of driving some pirates out of the market. Therefore, firms try to avoid 
converting pirates into do-nothing consumers by dropping prices, which is similar to the effect that 
Sundararajan (2004) reports. In case B, however, there is no “do-nothing” segment; therefore, the 
incumbent firm can increase prices to ensure the software is out of the price range of potential pirates. 
Therefore, in case B, the incumbent firm uses its price and piracy control as two opposing levers to 
maintain the right balance of pirates in the market. 
As Table 2 shows, the quality of pirated goods has a positive overall effect on legal product demand 
(cases B, C or D) or zero (in case A). In Cases B, C, and D, the added demand counteracts lower prices 
and higher costs of piracy control, but we show that, for most parameter combinations, profits tend to 
decline due to an increase in q. This result highlights the importance of maintaining a large quality gap 
between the legal and illegal copies. As we discuss in Implication 1 above, a larger quality gap is even 
more crucial with high network externalities. Otherwise, producers face the prospect of lower profits even 
in the presence of relatively low-quality pirated goods. 
3 Introducing Varying Piracy Costs and Open Source Alternatives 
(OSS) 
We enhance model 1 by sequentially introducing two new complications in the analysis. We first model 
varying piracy costs and next model a scenario with an open source alternative in the choice set. 
                                                     
2 If incumbent firms’ costs to control piracy are independent of pirated good quality, firms will tend to increase the level of piracy 
control if the pirated good’s quality increases. However, as we explain in Section 2.1, it is more reasonable to assume that piracy 
control costs are likely to increase if pirated good’s quality is high.  
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3.1 Varying Piracy Costs 
We now relax the assumption that all consumers have the same cost of pirating (we refer to this as model 
2). More specifically, we assume that the cost of pirating per unit of piracy is a uniform random variable 
with c  [0, 1]. We assume the distribution of c to be independent of the distribution of the consumers’ 
valuation of the good (X). Since c is a random variable, the regions for the different segments differ. 
 
1. A consumer would buy the incumbent product if 𝑥 ≥ 𝛼(𝜓𝑙𝑒𝑔 + 𝑞𝜓𝑝𝑖𝑟) + 𝑝 [Line (1)] AND 
x(1 − p) ≥ 𝑝 − 𝑐𝐿 [Line (3)]                                                  
 
(7) 
2. A consumer would pirate if qx − cL + α(ψleg + qψpir) ≥ 0 [Line (2)] AND 
x(1 − p) ≤ 𝑝 − 𝑐𝐿 [Line (3)] 
 
(8) 
3. A consumer would choose to do-nothing if x ≤ α(ψleg + qψpir) + p [Line (1)] AND 
𝑞x − cL + 𝛼(ψ𝑙𝑒𝑔 + 𝑞ψ𝑝𝑖𝑟) ≤ 0 [Line (2)] 
(9) 
Figure 3 shows the regions for the three outcomes for the given values of p and L. The three line 
segments correspond to the lines identified in the three conditions stated above in Equations 7, 8, and 9. 
Given the complexity of the demand equations, closed-form solutions to the optimization problem were 
intractable. 
From Figure 3, we observe that one can eliminate the do-nothing segment when p = α. At this point, the 
piracy region (blue stripes in Figure 3) increases with q and α. Thus, the implications of an increased 
pirated good quality and network externality remain similar to that under Implication 2 in this case. 
 
 
Figure 3. Demand Regions with Consumers Distributed Randomly Over x and c 
3.2 Model with Open Source Alternative 
We now introduce a non-profit seeking open source alternative (OSS) in the consumers’ choice set. We 
assume that consumers value this new alternative (Y) uniformly over
 
Y  [0, θY]. An Incumbent firm’s 
product quality is assumed to be higher than the quality of the pirated good (qP <1) and the OSS 
alternative (qO<1). In this setting, the OSS sells at a price pO, which may be zero or a relatively small 
positive value to reflect service costs that may be associated with its use. The incumbent firm continues to 
charge its own price (p). One may define consumer utility in the presence of OSS as (model 3): 
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𝑈𝑖 =
{
 
 
𝑋𝑖 + 𝛼(𝜓𝑙𝑒𝑔 + 𝑞𝑃𝜓𝑝𝑖𝑟) − 𝑝
𝑞𝑂𝑋𝑖 + 𝛼𝑞𝑂𝜓𝑂 − 𝑝𝑂
𝑞𝑃𝑋𝑖 + 𝛼(𝜓𝑙𝑒𝑔 + 𝑞𝑃𝜓𝑝𝑖𝑟) − 𝑐𝐿
0
 
Buy a legitimate copy from incumbent 
Buy an OSS copy 
Buy a pirated copy 
Do nothing 
(10) 
Open-source consumers also benefit from network externalities (α), and we assume that the overall 
externality benefit depends on the mean quality of OSS alternatives (qO). As such, consistent with the 
assumption we make for pirated copies (see Section 2.1), for any given user-base, a lower-quality product 
will generate smaller externality benefits for its consumers. We also note that a base level of externality 
benefit would accrue from using any available product in a software market. However, producers can 
confer unique externality benefits for users of a specific product. From this perspective, one can consider 
the externality benefits in our model as the incremental benefit over and above the base level conferred to 
all users.  
To more clearly illustrate the segments, we assume Yi = Xi (otherwise, one would need a three-
dimensional graph to represent the regions). 
1. A consumer would opt to do-nothing if q𝑂x < 𝑝𝑂 − 𝛼q𝑂ψ𝑂 [Line (1)] AND 
q𝑃x < 𝑐𝐿 − 𝛼(q𝑃ψ𝑝𝑖𝑟 + ψ𝑙𝑒𝑔) [Line (2)] AND x < 𝑝 − 𝛼(q𝑃ψ𝑝𝑖𝑟 + ψ𝑙𝑒𝑔) [Line (3)] 
 
(11) 
2. A consumer would opt for the open source alternative if q𝑂x ≥ 𝑝𝑂 − 𝛼q𝑂ψ𝑂 [Line (1)] AND 
(q𝑂 − q𝑃)x ≥ 𝑝𝑂 + q𝑃𝛼ψ𝑝𝑖𝑟 + 𝛼ψ𝑙𝑒𝑔 − 𝑐𝐿 − 𝛼q𝑂ψ𝑂 [Line (4)] AND 
(1 − q𝑂)x < 𝛼q𝑂ψ𝑂 − 𝑝𝑂 + 𝑝 − (𝛼ψ𝑙𝑒𝑔 + 𝛼q𝑃ψ𝑝𝑖𝑟) [Line (5)] 
 
 
 
(12) 
3. A consumer would buy the incumbent product if x ≥ p − α(qPψpir + ψleg) [Line (3)] AND 
(1 − qO)x ≥ αqOψO − pO + p − (αψleg + αqPψpir) [Line (5)] AND 
x(1 − q𝑃) ≥ 𝑝 − 𝑐𝐿 [Line (6)] 
 
 
 
(13) 
4. A consumer would pirate if qPx ≥ cL − α(qPψpir + ψleg) [Line (2)] AND 
(qO − qP)x < pO + qPαψpir + αψleg − cL − αqOψO [Line (4)] AND 
x(1 − q𝑃) < 𝑝 − 𝑐𝐿 [Line (6)] 
 
 
 
(14) 
For the given values of p and L, Figure 4 shows a possible arrangement of the regions for the four 
outcomes. The six lines correspond to the lines we identify in the conditions in Equations 11-14. 
 
Figure 4. Possible Demand Segments for Model 3 
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4 Numerical Simulations 
Since closed-form solutions to model 2 (varying piracy costs) and model 3 (open source alternative) are 
intractable, we conducted extensive numerical simulations. More specifically, we simulated a more 
general specification of model 3 that allowed the correlation between the intrinsic valuations of the 
incumbent firm’s copy (𝑋𝑖) and the OSS copy (𝑌𝑖) to vary. In model 3 (Equation 10) the valuation of OSS 
is, for every consumer, a fixed proportion of the valuation of the incumbent firm’s good (𝑌𝑖 = 𝑞0𝑋𝑖), which 
implies that 𝑋 and 𝑌are perfectly correlated. We generated random samples of 1000 consumers, whose 
individual values of 𝑋𝑖and 𝑌𝑖 (i=1,2,3,…..1000) we randomly sampled from uniform distributions in the [0-1] 
and [0-𝜃𝑌] intervals, respectively (𝜃𝑌 < 1). The mean valuation of OSS (𝐸(𝑌) = 𝜃𝑌/2]) and the correlation 
with 𝑋𝑖 [𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑋, 𝑌)] could vary. One can interpret the ratio 𝐸(𝑌)/𝐸(𝑋) = 𝜃𝑌 as the average quality of the 
open source product (𝑞0). We also drew the unitary costs of pirating 𝑐𝑖 from a uniform distribution in the [0-
1.5] interval. Thus, this model has three additional parameters relative to models 1 and 2: 𝐸(𝑌) , 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑋, 𝑌) and 𝑝0. We used the following parameter values in the simulations: α= (0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1); 
𝑞𝑃 = (0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 0.95, 0.99); 𝐸(𝑌) = (0.1, 0.3), which implies 𝑞0 = (0.2, 0.6); 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑋, 𝑌) = (0, 0.5, 1); 
and 𝑝0= (0, 0.2). Therefore, we had 360 (5*6*2*3*2) possible combinations of parameter values. 
The simulations proceeded as follows: 
1. Given the individual values of Xi and ci drawn from uniform distributions as described above, 
we began by fixing the values of the model parameters: 𝛼, 𝑞𝑃, 𝐸(𝑌), 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑋, 𝑌), and 𝑝0 . 
2. Consistent with the adopted values of 𝐸(𝑌) and 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑋, 𝑌), we randomly sampled individual 
values of Yi from a uniform distribution. 
3. Over a pre-specified grid of values of p and L, we solved the model by computing: 1) the utility 
levels of the four alternatives (proprietary good, pirated good, open-source, and do-nothing) for 
each consumer through Equation 10 and 2) the proportions of consumers who chose each 
alternative (demand levels) that resulted from each consumer’s choosing the alternative with 
the highest utility.  
4. Given the level of demand for the proprietary good found in the previous step for each 
combination of p and L, we computed the corresponding level of firm profit through 𝜋𝑙𝑒𝑔 =
 𝑝𝜓𝑙𝑒𝑔 − (𝐿𝑞)
2. We then selected the profit maximizing (p, L) combination.  
5. We repeated steps 1 to 4 for each combination of model parameters. For each one of those 
simulations, we tabulated the exogenous parameter values, the profit maximizing levels of 𝑝 
and L, the demand levels 𝜓𝑙𝑒𝑔, 𝜓𝑝𝑖𝑟, 𝜓𝑂𝑆 and the producer profit π𝑙𝑒𝑔. 
We simulated model 2 following a similar procedure, but, since three of the parameters 𝐸(𝑌), 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑋, 𝑌) 
and 𝑝0 were absent, the model contained only 30 different combinations of α and 𝑞.  
To understand the impact of market conditions on firm strategy, demand, and profits, we pooled the data 
from the two models and regressed the equilibrium values of the endogenous variables on: 1) the levels of 
quality and network externalities (𝑞 and α), 2) a dummy variable (DOSS) that takes the value of 1 when the 
OSS alternative is present in the market (model 3) and zero otherwise (model 2), 3) an interaction term 
(q*) between quality and externalities (since we conclude in Section 2.3 that externalities mediate the 
effects of pirated goods quality on the seller of the proprietary good), 4) interaction effects between DOSS 
and all model parameters. We adopted non-linear equations in those regressions as we explain in Section 
4.2 below. 
4.1 Model Validation 
To validate the model, we also simulated model 1 with which we could compare the simulation results to 
the analytical model solutions (no open source and fixed c as in Section 2). We compared the numerical 
results obtained from the closed-form solutions of the base model (model 1) with that of the simulation 
program. The results obtained from the simulation program at various parameter values were close to 
optimal solutions. Table 3 shows a sample of these results. In general, the simulation results align with the 
analytical results and, more importantly, we observe that the direction of change in optimal values is the 
same in the two models. 
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4.2 Model Results 
We use regression analysis to examine how the equilibrium variables respond to the model parameters. 
More specifically, Table 4 reports the main effects of estimating those relationships with a logistic 
functional form and Table 5 reports the main and interaction effects. We found that the regression 
estimation fit the data well. Note that 𝐸(𝑌), 𝑝0  and 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑋, 𝑌) could only enter the estimated equation 
through such interactions since the simulation program defines them only in the presence of OSS (i.e., 
when DOSS=1). 
Table 3. Comparison of Analytical Model and Simulation Results 
α q p* 
p* 
(sim.) 
L* 
L* 
(sim.) 
ψLeg ψLeg (sim.) ψpir 
ψpir 
(sim.) 
ψdo-nothing 
ψdo-
nothing  
(sim.) 
Profit 
Profit 
(sim.) 
0.2 0.6 0.421 0.46 0.414 0.44 0.724 0.697 0.000 0.006 0.276 0.297 0.243 0.251 
0.2 0.8 0.308 0.3 0.375 0.36 0.865 0.873 0.000 0.034 0.135 0.093 0.177 0.179 
0.2 0.99 0.210 0.24 0.280 0.32 0.987 0.966 0.000 0 0.013 0.034 0.131 0.131 
0.4 0.2 0.505 0.52 0.487 0.5 0.825 0.834 0.000 0 0.175 0.166 0.407 0.424 
0.4 0.4 0.500 0.5 0.533 0.54 0.833 0.867 0.000 0.015 0.167 0.118 0.371 0.387 
0.4 0.6 0.447 0.48 0.554 0.58 0.922 0.897 0.000 0 0.078 0.103 0.301 0.309 
0.4 0.8 0.400 0.38 0.533 0.5 1.000 0.983 0.000 0.017 0.000 0 0.218 0.214 
0.4 0.99 0.400 0.3 0.533 0.4 1.000 1 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.121 0.143 
0.6 0.2 0.600 0.62 0.800 0.8 1.000 0.98 0.000 0 0.000 0.02 0.574 0.582 
0.6 0.4 0.600 0.62 0.800 0.8 1.000 0.979 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.02 0.498 0.505 
0.6 0.6 0.600 0.6 0.800 0.8 1.000 1 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.370 0.370 
 
Table 4. Results of Non-linear Regression Analysis with Main Effects 
 P L leg pir OS π 
q 
-2.472*** 
(.091) 
-4.083*** 
(.247) 
-.714*** 
(.118) 
2.435*** 
(.068) 
-2.156*** 
(.358) 
-2.604*** 
(.134) 
 
0.993*** 
(.068) 
2.818*** 
(.191) 
.477*** 
(.096) 
.580*** 
(.047) 
-2.164*** 
(.319) 
0.801*** 
(.088) 
DOSS 
-.250*** 
(.081) 
-.399** 
(.188) 
-.121 
(.126) 
-.143** 
(.057) 
- 
-.308*** 
(.098) 
DOSS*pO# - - - - 
-6.871*** 
(1.139) 
- 
DOSS*E(Y)# - - - - 
5.376*** 
(1.01) 
- 
DOSS*Corr(X,Y) 
# 
- - - - 
-.302 
(.209) 
- 
Const 
.445*** 
(.095) 
.617*** 
(.215) 
.856*** 
(.149) 
-2.836*** 
(.080) 
-.619** 
(.318) 
-.258** 
(.118) 
N 390 390 390 390 360 390 
R2 .95 .88 .95 .96 .46 .86 
Notes: # the three terms are main effects of price of the OSS product (Po), quality of the OSS product (E(Y)), and the correlation 
between the incumbent and OSS product (Corr (X,Y)). They are relevant only in the presence of OSS. 
*** p< 1% ; ** p< 5% ; * p< 10%  
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Table 5. Results of Non-linear Regression Analysis with Main Effects 
 P L leg pir OS π 
q 
-2.184*** 
(.287) 
-0.818 
(.637) 
-.334 
(.464) 
2.502*** 
(.219) 
-1.374*** 
(.435) 
-2.268*** 
(.422) 
 
1.836*** 
(.225) 
6.107*** 
(.574) 
1.292*** 
(.419) 
1.205*** 
(.194) 
-.586 
(.579) 
1.608*** 
(.276) 
DOSS 
-.342* 
(.182) 
-.728* 
(.406) 
-.109 
(.356) 
-.377** 
(.188) 
- 
.139 
(.235) 
q* 
-1.541*** 
(.216) 
-6.905*** 
(.567) 
-1.337*** 
(.345) 
-.878*** 
(.182) 
-3.583** 
(1.503) 
-1.513*** 
(.333) 
DOSS*q 
.552** 
(.277) 
.825 
(.632) 
.263 
(.454) 
.471** 
(.201) 
- 
.467 
(.398) 
DOSS* 
-.067 
(.202) 
.028 
(.470) 
.045 
(.367) 
.053 
(.148) 
- 
-.176 
(.254) 
DOSS*pO 
1.497*** 
(.190) 
2.471*** 
(.417) 
.382 
(.332) 
.761*** 
(.147) 
-6.405*** 
(1.064) 
1.110*** 
(.260) 
DOSS*E(Y) 
-1.956*** 
(.193) 
-2.689*** 
(.423) 
-1.048*** 
(.336) 
-1.142*** 
(.149) 
5.543*** 
(.996) 
-2.947*** 
(.273) 
DOSS*Corr(X,Y) 
.116** 
(.046) 
.294*** 
(.100) 
-.047 
(.081) 
.014 
(.036) 
-.181 
(.203) 
-.208*** 
(.063) 
Const 
.301* 
(.177) 
-.711* 
(.391) 
.634* 
(.347) 
-2.880*** 
(.192) 
-1.122*** 
(.342) 
-0.487** 
(.227) 
N 390 390 390 390 360 390 
R2 .97 .93 .95 .97 .47 .90 
To illustrate our main results, we also show in Figures 5, 6, and 7 how the fitted values of the endogenous 
variables vary with the quality of the pirated good. We do so for two extreme levels of network externalities 
( = 0.1,  = 0.9) and also for the “OSS absent” and “OSS present” scenarios. 
Our results confirmed the overall implications in Section 2.3. For example, Tables 4 and 5 show that price 
(P), piracy controls (L), legal demand (𝜓𝑙𝑒𝑔 ) and profits () are positively and significantly related to 
network externalities (in accordance with Implication 1). Similarly, a higher-quality pirated good has a 
negative effect on an incumbent firm’s piracy control, price, and profits (consistent with Implication 2). 
Finally, the negative estimate for q*α in the profit equation confirms that increases in the quality of the 
pirated good harms the incumbent firm more at high externality levels (consistent with Implications 1 and 
2). Next, we investigate the impact of the appearance of an OSS alternative in the market (relative to the 
“no OSS” case). 
Implication 3: The existence of open-source software in the market causes the incumbent firm to 
not just charge lower prices but also be more tolerant towards piracy. 
The significant parameter estimates of DOSS in Table 4 show the main effects of an open source 
alternative on price and piracy control. We observe the same effects in the more fully specified models in 
Table 5. The impact of an open source alternative on price is in line with Casadesus-Masanell and 
Ghemawat’s (2006) findings, and one can regard them as a consequence of lower market power. Lower 
piracy control results from the fact that, under network externalities, pirates become firms’ allies against 
the threat that OSS poses. One can clearly see both of these effects in Figures 5, 6, and 7 by comparing 
the “no OSS” and “OSS” lines. Thus, while price and piracy controls reduce in response to a higher-quality 
pirated good, these strategic actions mitigate the detrimental effects of OSS. Interestingly, the levels of 
piracy tend to be lower in the presence of OSS, which suggests that the existence of a zero (or very low) 
price OSS alternative and the lower price of proprietary software outweigh the stimulus that lower piracy 
controls provide to privates. Also, the open source alternative had no significant impact on incumbent’s 
demand. Thus, OSS products are more likely to attract consumers who would have otherwise pirated.  
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Figure 5. Estimated Levels of Endogenous Variables as a Function of the Quality of Pirated Goods 
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Figure 6. Estimated Levels of Endogenous Variables as a Function of the Quality of Pirated Goods 
 
  
Journal of the Association for Information Systems 17  
 
Volume 18   Issue 1  
 
 
Figure 7. Estimated Levels of Endogenous Variables as a Function of the Quality of Pirated Goods 
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Implication 4:  An incumbent’s profit loss due to OSS tends to be smaller in comparison to high-
quality pirated alternatives. 
In Table 4, the estimated parameters of q and DOSS suggest that high-quality pirated goods more severely 
affect a firm’s profits than the presence of an OSS alternative does. As for why, OSS products mainly 
cause likely pirates to switch to them (note the lack of significance of DOSS on incumbent demand in Table 
4). Further, as the negative effect of DOSS on piracy control indicates, incumbent costs go down as well. 
The combined effect results in a somewhat muted impact on profits. The joint impact of q and DOSS is also 
interesting in this context. We observe that the joint impact q and DOSS results in increase in price but not 
on piracy control and has no impact on profit. The intuition for this is that the joint impact contributes to 
profit through price increase (note there is no significant impact on incumbent demand) and the higher-
quality pirated good also contributes to an increase in the demand for pirated good. In essence, the 
preservation of externality benefits due to increased pirate demand enables firm to successfully counter 
negative impacts on the bottom line. Consequently, despite being very detrimental in the absence of OSS, 
high-quality piracy mitigates the negative effects that the emergence of an open-source competitor 
imposes on the incumbent. This result is also clearly visible in Figures 5, 6, and 7 (with the distance 
between the “No OSS” and the “OSS” profit lines declining as q increases).  
Implication 5:  Higher-quality OSS alternatives force firms to lower their product’s prices and piracy 
controls, which results in lower overall demand for the firm’s product and its pirated 
copies. On the other hand, highly correlated intrinsic valuation may cause firms to 
increase their product’s price and piracy controls. 
Higher-quality OSS affects price and piracy controls in a fairly straightforward and expected manner. 
However, correlated valuation affects them in a more nuanced manner. Consider a fixed ratio between 
mean consumers’ valuations of the two goods. A higher correlation in valuation implies that the two 
products in the market offer similar intrinsic features and benefits. A side benefit of commonality in 
features (and the increase in piracy control) is that many pirates may find it beneficial to adopt OSS. 
However, any consumer switching from pirating incumbent’s product to adopting OSS reduces externality 
benefits for the incumbent group. The extent to which an open source alternative reduces externality 
benefits depends on the quality of the pirated good (and the magnitude of the externality parameter). 
Moreover, increase in price may cause some consumers to either pirate (despite higher piracy control) or 
switch to OSS or do-nothing. As such, the opposing effects of price and piracy controls due to correlation 
in intrinsic valuation limit the shifts in demand. The significant negative impact on profit will result from the 
incumbent firm’s increased costs of implementing higher-level piracy controls. 
5 Discussion and Conclusions 
To our knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the strategic options for dealing with product piracy 
in the presence of an OSS alternative. We propose a theoretical model to discuss the impact of OSS and 
other market conditions on market equilibrium and the choice of policy instruments. We also perform a 
simulation analysis of how the quality of pirated software and the presence of an OSS alternative impacts 
endogenous decision variables (piracy control and price), demand and profit.   
Our theoretical model indicates that network externalities contribute to increasing firms’ products’ price, 
piracy controls, and the profits they make. Thus, in contrast to most of the existing literature, we show that 
it may be optimal to increase piracy protection in response to increasing network externalities. However, 
we also show that, when the quality of the pirated good increases, an incumbent firm chooses to lower 
piracy control level and price. As such, firms may need to innovate more with their pricing models. In fact, 
some firms have already begun to do so. Recently, Microsoft shifted to a strategy in which it pre-installs a 
limited-feature Office version on new computers. When one buys the computer and uses the software, the 
software prompts consumers to purchase the full version. Such presumably forced sampling can 
potentially reduce some consumer segments from pirating. One could also offer free or lower-cost 
upgrades to consumers who may have already used previous versions of a product. For instance, 
Microsoft and Apple offer free operating systems upgrades to previous users. Besides increasing the 
overall value of the software product, free upgrades can also be effective in combating OSS competitors. 
To summarize, our research reveals that the quality differential between a legal good and its pirated 
version is an important determinant of equilibrium outcomes.  
As our results demonstrate, network externalities amplify high-quality piracy’s detrimental effect on an 
incumbent firm’s profits. Therefore, our results highlight the importance of maintaining a large quality gap 
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between a product and its illegal substitutes, particularly in markets characterized by high network 
externalities. One effective approach to lowering pirate good quality is to limit software updates and 
patches to legitimate copies only. Such an approach is becoming prevalent among most consumer 
software goods producers. 
Our simulations of the theoretical model also yielded important insights regarding the appearance of an 
OSS alternative in the market. Specifically, we show that OSS reduces the profits of a legitimate firm and 
causes both its product’s price and piracy controls to drop. This finding lends credence to some anecdotal 
observations made in industry publications. For example, Baker (2009, p. 1) identifies the rise in popularity 
of OSS as one of the main reasons why Microsoft, “a company known to be almost brutal in its license-
protection strategies, softened its approach to piracy.”. 
The effects of an open source alternative on a firm’s strategies, sales, and profits also depend on several 
other factors. We highlight the role of pirated goods’ quality in moderating the impact of OSS alternatives 
on the demand for an incumbent’s product and its profit. Specifically, we demonstrate that, although OSS 
alternatives reduce profits for an incumbent, the presence of a high-quality pirated good mitigates this 
impact. Thus, although a wholehearted attempt at fighting pirates is the optimal strategy in the absence of 
OSS, tolerating the presence of high-quality pirated goods may actually be beneficial in the presence of 
OSS. This finding suggests that, when a firm has two powerful enemies to contend with (i.e., OSS and 
pirated software), the presence of the less powerful enemy (i.e., high-quality pirated good) is a blessing in 
disguise for the incumbent firm. 
Several important research questions still remain in this domain. For instance, some consumers may 
prefer to try multiple alternatives simultaneously, and we did not account for this possibility in our models. 
The implication of multi-period dynamics of endogenous demand and firms’ strategic decisions is also an 
important open research question. A dynamic model could also explore the strategic interactions between 
an OSS entrant and an established incumbent firm’s product. Further, when an established incumbent 
firm moves to application (app) markets where piracy is becoming more prevalent, future research could 
examine using updates as a strategic tool to combat the threat of piracy in the presence of open source 
(free) apps. 
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